



The Feasibility of Environmental and Wastewater Surveillance for Nipah Virus

Dr. Erik Karlsson
Head of Virology Unit
Institut Pasteur du Cambodge

Why Nipah challenges conventional surveillance


- Nipah virus remains one of the most consequential zoonotic pathogens precisely because it does *not* behave like the viruses most surveillance systems are designed for.
- Outbreaks are:
 - Rare
 - Highly focal
 - Often detected late
- Transmission is:
 - Zoonotic
 - Environmentally mediated
 - Strongly shaped by ecology and human behavior





What we mean by environmental detection

- Environmental detection refers to identifying **Nipah virus RNA outside the host**, including:
 - Water and wastewater
 - Air and surfaces
 - Soil and urine-contaminated environments
 - Food items and food-contact surfaces
- Important framing:
 - Detection \neq infectious virus
 - Detection \neq human infection
 - Environmental signals are **contextual indicators of risk**
- Environmental surveillance is best understood as an **upstream early-warning layer**, particularly where clinical cases are rare or delayed.



Environmental persistence: how long does the signal last?

- Henipaviruses are environmentally fragile, but not instantly so.
- Evidence shows:
 - Survival for several days in:
 - pH-neutral bat urine
 - Sugary fruit matrices (e.g., mango, lychee)
 - Contaminated sap
 - Reduced survival with:
 - Heat
 - Desiccation
 - UV exposure
 - Extremes of pH
- Environmental detection windows are short but meaningful, favoring recent contamination events and targeted sampling.

Wastewater and Airline Waste Surveillance for Nipah Virus (Where could we look?)

Municipal & Facility Wastewater

- **Best settings**
 - Hospitals and referral centers
 - Encephalitis wards and isolation units
 - Small, defined catchments
 - Livestock interfaces (pig farms, slaughter facilities)
- **Why it could work**
 - Nipah virus RNA is shed in urine, saliva, feces, blood and tissue fluids, contaminated food matrices
 - Wastewater integrates signals from symptomatic and pre-symptomatic individuals
 - Livestock wastewater captures **spillover and amplification risk**




Wastewater and Airline Waste Surveillance for Nipah Virus (Where could we look?)

Aircraft Wastewater

- **What it adds**
 - Captures signals from travelers before healthcare contact
 - Provides early indication of cross-border movement from outbreak regions
 - Non-invasive and independent of testing compliance
- **Best use**
 - Targeted sampling of flights from areas with known or suspected Nipah activity
 - Situational awareness during regional outbreaks





But what do we need to detect Nipah in environmental samples?

Key requirements

- Highly sensitive, lineage-inclusive RT-qPCR
- Careful interpretation: detection is **probabilistic, not diagnostic**
- Sequencing confirmation when viral load permits

Nipah genetic diversity: why lineage matters

Nipah virus is genetically diverse, with two major lineages of public health importance:

- Lineage 1 (Malaysia)
 - Historically associated with pig amplification
- Lineage 2 (Bangladesh)
 - More frequently linked to direct bat-to-human transmission
 - Associated with recent documented human-to-human transmission
- Critical point: Evidence indicates that both Malaysia-like and Bangladesh-like Nipah lineages circulate in Cambodian bat populations.
- Environmental and wastewater assays must:
 - Be lineage-inclusive
 - Avoid primer bias
 - Maintain sensitivity across genetic diversity



Molecular detection: sensitivity is foundational

Environmental and wastewater samples typically contain **very low concentrations of viral RNA**.

- Effective detection therefore requires:
 - Highly sensitive RT-qPCR assays
 - Careful management of inhibitors
 - Lineage-inclusive primer design

For example:

- Assays capable of detecting **~5–50 genomic copies per reaction**
- Validated across both Bangladesh and Malaysia lineages

RT-qPCR Detection
of Nipah Virus (NiV)
Targeting the
Nucleocapsid (N)
Gene





Sequencing: confirming and contextualizing detection

PCR detection alone is not sufficient.

Sequencing allows:

- Confirmation of specificity
- Lineage assignment
- Monitoring of viral evolution

Practical considerations:

- Amplicon-based sequencing performs well
- Reliable results typically require:
- Ct values $\leq 29-30$
- Samples above this threshold often yield incomplete genomes

Sequencing capacity should be built into surveillance design from the outset.

Sequencing of
Nipah Virus (NiV)
Using Oxford
Nanopore MinION



Environmental metagenomics: powerful but not sufficient alone

Environmental metagenomics offers important advantages:

- Unbiased detection
- Ability to detect unexpected or novel viruses
- Insight into broader viral ecology

From Cambodia:

- Nipah virus RNA has been detected in bat urine and environmental samples using metagenomic approaches
- However:
 - Signal is typically very low
 - Reads are sparse
 - Detection is inconsistent

Metagenomics is excellent for:

- Discovery
- Contextualization
- Hypothesis generation

But for Nipah surveillance, it is best used **in combination with targeted PCR**, not as a standalone screening tool.





Nipah Virus in Water/Liquids: Documented Detection vs Biologically Plausible Pathways

Documented

Raw date palm sap (Bangladesh) – Nipah virus RNA detected directly in sap collected from pots contaminated by bat saliva and urine

Sap collection vessels (Bangladesh) – Residual liquid inside pots positive for Nipah virus RNA after bat feeding

Surface water beneath bat roosts (Cambodia & Malaysia) – Nipah virus RNA detected in pooled urine-contaminated water under *Pteropus* roosts

Standing water at bat roost sites (Cambodia) – Repeated environmental contamination during peak shedding periods

Water and pasture contaminated by bat excreta (Australia – Hendra virus): Hendra virus detected in water-adjacent environmental materials contaminated by bat urine and feces



Nipah Virus in Water/Liquids: Documented Detection vs Biologically Plausible Pathways

Biologically Plausible

Farm water and runoff: Virus introduced via bat-contaminated fruit with amplification in pigs, leading to contamination of shared water sources

Drainage water from animal holding and slaughter areas: Contamination via urine, blood, and tissue fluids during pig infection and processing

Human wastewater (outbreak settings): Nipah virus RNA shed in urine during human infection; targeted wastewater surveillance feasible

Mixed human–livestock wastewater systems: Convergence of bat, livestock, and human shedding into shared drainage



Will it work?

Thank You

Research and Reponse at IPC would not be possible without these funders, partners, and collaborators and many others



ekarlsson@pasteur-kh.org



@E_A_Karlsson



@eakarlsson.bsky.social



@ekarlsson@mstdn.science



BILL & MELINDA
GATES foundation



IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency



Food and Agriculture
Organization of the
United Nations



World Organisation
for Animal Health
Founded as OIE



World Health
Organization



GISRS
GLOBAL INFLUENZA
SURVEILLANCE &
RESPONSE SYSTEM
SINCE 1952



GLOBAL HEALTH
INSTITUTE

